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Why quantum bit commitment and
ideal quantum coin tossing are impossible.∗
Hoi-Kwong Lo†and H. F. Chau‡
School of Natural Sciences, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540
There had been well known claims of “provably unbreakable” quantum protocols for bit commit-
ment and coin tossing. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum
bit commitment (and therefore coin tossing) schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender,
Alice, can always cheat successfully by using an EPR-type of attack and delaying her measurements.
One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment and coin tossing protocols exist at all. Here
we prove that an EPR-type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any realistic quantum bit
commitment and ideal coin tossing scheme. Therefore, provided that Alice has a quantum computer
and is capable of storing quantum signals for an arbitrary length of time, all those schemes are
insecure. Since bit commitment and coin tossing are useful primitives for building up more sophis-
ticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security
of quantum cryptography in the so-called “post-cold-war” applications.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography was first proposed by Wiesner
[21] more than two decades ago in a paper that remained
unpublished until 1983. Recently, there have been lots of
renewed activities in the subject. The most well-known
application of quantum cryptography is key distribution
[4, 6, 10]. The aim of key distribution is to allow two
users to generate a shared random string of informa-
tion that can, for example, be used to make their mes-
sages in subsequent communication totally unintelligible
to an eavesdropper. Quantum key distribution is secure
[3, 9, 16, 18, 20] because, it is impossible (for an eaves-
dropper) to make copies (or clones) of non-orthogonal
states in quantum mechanics without violating unitar-
ity. Moreover, measuring a quantum system generally
disturbs it because quantum mechanical observables can
be non-commuting. For this reason, eavesdropping an a
quantum communication channel will generally leave un-
avoidable disturbance in the transmitted signal which can
be detected by the legitimate users.
In addition to key distribution, the so-called “post-cold-
war” applications of quantum cryptography have also
been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8]. A typical problem in
“post-cold-war” quantum cryptography is the two-party
secure computation, in which both parties would like to
know the result of a computation but neither side wishes
to reveal its own data. For example, two firms will embark
on a joint venture if and only if their combined capital
available for the project is larger than one million dol-
lars. They would like to know if this condition is fulfilled
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but neither wishes to reveal the exact amount of capital
it commits to the project. In classical cryptography, this
can be done either through trusted intermediaries or by
invoking some unproven cryptographic assumptions such
as the hardness of factoring. The big question is whether
quantum cryptography can get rid of those requirements
and achieve the same goal using the laws of physics alone.
This paper relates to those post-cold-war applications
of quantum cryptography. Until recently, there had been
much optimism in the subject. Various protocols for say
bit commitment, coin tossing and oblivious transfer of
quantum cryptography had been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8].
In particular, the BCJL [8] bit commitment scheme had
been claimed to be provably unbreakable. However, in our
recent paper [17], we showed that all proposed quantum
bit commitment schemes are insecure because the sender,
Alice, can always cheat successfully by using an EPR-type
of attack and delaying her measurement until she opens
her commitment. (The insecurity of the BCJL scheme
was also investigated by Mayers [19] from an information-
theoretic point of view.) Our result put the security of
post-cold-war quantum cryptographic systems in serious
doubt because bit commitment is a crucial primitive in
building up more sophisticated protocols. In particular,
it has been shown by Yao [22] that a secure quantum
bit commitment scheme can be used to implement a se-
cure quantum oblivious transfer scheme whereas Kilian
[15] has shown that, in classical cryptography, oblivious
transfer can be used to implement many protocols such
as oblivious circuit evaluation, which is a close cousin of
secure two-party computation. This chain of arguments,
therefore, seems to suggest that quantum bit commitment
alone is sufficient for implementing secure two-party com-
putation or its close cousin. However, without quantum
bit commitment, it is not clear if secure two-party com-
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putation can be achieved through quantum means at all.
While we showed in our previous paper [17] the insecu-
rity of all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes, an
important fundamental question that we left unanswered
was whether any secure quantum bit commitment scheme
exists at all. Here we show that, provided that a cheater
has a quantum computer and is capable of storing quan-
tum signals for an arbitrary length of time, quantum bit
commitment and ideal quantum coin tossing are impos-
sible: All such protocols are necessarily insecure against
an EPR-type of attack by at least one of the users. In
our opinion, our highly disruptive results can be taken
as a strong indication that, despite widespread early op-
timism, realistic post-cold-war applications of quantum
cryptography simply do not exist. We acknowledge the
receipt of a preprint of Dominic Mayers about the impossi-
bility of quantum bit commitment. This preprint contains
the essential result and approach to bit commitment that
we present here except that, in our opinion, it does not
define in sufficient detail the general model that it uses for
quantum protocols and therefore the model is too vague.
To answer the question in a more satisfactory manner and
to make the discussion more precise, we strongly felt the
need to use a variant of the Yao’s model. Besides, our
discussion on ideal quantum coin tossing makes essential
use of such a concrete model.
2 Quantum bit commitment
A general bit commitment scheme involves two parties,
a sender Alice and a receiver, Bob. Suppose that Alice
has a bit (b = 0 or 1) in mind, to which she would like
to be committed towards Bob. That is to say, she wishes
to provide Bob with a piece of evidence that she has a
bit in mind and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile,
Bob should not be able to tell from that evidence what b
is. At a later time, however, it must be possible for Alice
to open the commitment. That is, Alice must be able to
show Bob which bit she has committed to and convinced
him that this is indeed the genuine bit that she had in
mind when she committed.1
What constitutes to a cheating by Alice? If Alice com-
mits to a particular value of b (e.g., b = 0) during the
commitment phase and attempts to change it to another
value (e.g., b = 1) during the opening phase, Alice is
cheating. A bit commitment scheme is secure against Al-
ice only if such a fake commitment will be discovered by
Bob. In this section, we show that, contrary to popu-
lar belief, all quantum bit commitment schemes are, in
principle, insecure against a cheating Alice.
1A bit commitment scheme is useful for say implementing a coin
tossing scheme. See footnote 5 below.
2.1 Model of two-party quantum proto-
cols
Quantum bit commitment and coin tossing are examples
of two-party quantum protocols. A two-party quantum
protocol involves a pair of quantum machines in the hands
of two users, A (Alice) and B (Bob) respectively, which
interact with each other through a quantum channel, C.
More formally, we consider the direct product H of the
three Hilbert spaces HA, HB and HC where HA (HB)
is the Hilbert space of Alice’s (Bob’s) machine and HC is
the Hilbert space of the channel. We assume that initially
each machine is in some specified pure quantum state. A
and B then engage in a number of rounds of quantum
communication with each other through the channel C.
More concretely, A and B alternately performs a unitary
transformation on HD ⊗HC where D ∈ {A,B}.
The above model is a simplification of a model proposed
by Yao [22]. Although Yao apparently did not emphasize
the generality of his model, it appears to us that any re-
alistic two-party computation can be described by Yao’s
model. For instance, since Alice and Bob are separated by
a long distance, it is impractical to demand simultaneous
two-way communications between them. The idea of al-
ternate rounds of one-way communications in Yao’s model
is, therefore, reasonable. However, there are two signif-
icant distinctions between Yao’s model and ours. First,
Yao’s model deals with mixed initial states whereas we
assume that the initial state of each machine is pure. Sec-
ond, in Yao’s model, the user D does two things in each
round of the communication: D carries out a measure-
ment on the current mixed state of the portion of the
space, HD ⊗HC , in his/her control and then performs a
unitary transformation on HD ⊗HC . In our model, the
measurement step has been eliminated.
Nevertheless, we would like to argue that there is no
loss in generality and that our model still gives the most
general procedure of a two-party quantum protocol. Let
us consider the first distinction. In assuming that the
initial state of each machine is pure, we are just giving
the users complete control over the initial states of the
machines. Any situation with mixed initial state can be
included in our consideration simply by attaching a quan-
tum dice to a machine and considering the pure state as
describing the combined state of the two.
What about the second distinction? We make the sim-
ple but crucial observation that one can avoid dealing with
the collapse of a wavefunction associated with a measure-
ment altogether. The point is, that, in principle, D has
the option of adding an ancilla to his/her quantum ma-
chine and using a reversible unitary operation to replace
a measurement. D can then read off the state of his/her
ancilla only at the very end of the protocol. Put it another
way: Alice and Bob are assumed to be in possession of
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quantum computers and quantum storage devices. Note
that our model is general enough to incorporate any clas-
sical computation and communications: An algorithm on
classical computers can clearly be simulated by quantum
computers. It cannot be overemphasized that this uni-
tary description leads to no loss in generality and indeed
any two-party quantum protocol can be described by our
model. (See [12] and, in particular, the Appendix B of
the revised version of [16] for related discussions.)2 Such
a unitary description will greatly simplify our discussion.
Of course, the faithful execution of most quantum bit
commitment protocols do not require the users to possess
quantum computers. We use a unitary description merely
to simplify our discussions. The point is the following: If
a cheater can cheat successfully against an honest party
who has a quantum computer (and quantum storage de-
vices), clearly he/she can also cheat successfully against
one who does not have a quantum computer (nor quan-
tum storage devices). This is because an honest party
without a quantum computer can be regarded as a spe-
cial case of one who has a quantum computer but fails to
make full use of it.
2.2 Procedure of quantum bit commit-
ment
Granting the possession of quantum computers and quan-
tum storage devices by Alice, the most general proce-
dure for an ideal quantum bit commitment scheme can
be rephrased in the following manner.
(a) Preparation of states: Alice chooses the value of
a bit b to which she would like to be committed towards
Bob. If b = 0 (respectively b = 1), she prepares a state |0〉
(respectively |1〉) for HA. The two states |0〉 and |1〉 are
orthogonal to each other. Bob prepares a state |B0〉⊗|C0〉
for the product Hilbert space HB ⊗ HC . All the states
|0〉, |1〉 and |B0〉 ⊗ |C0〉 are specified by the protocol and
are known to both Alice and Bob.
(b) The actual commitment: Step (b) involves a speci-
fied and fixed number of rounds of quantum communica-
tion alternately between Alice and Bob. As noted above,
each round of quantum communication can be modeled
as a unitary transformation on HD ⊗HC (D ∈ {A,B}),
which in turn induces a unitary transformation on the
space H = HA ⊗HB ⊗HC .
Notice that for an ideal bit commitment, it must be
the case that, at the end of step (b), Bob still has abso-
lutely no information about the value of the committed
bit b. (We will relax this assumption when we come to the
non-ideal case in the next subsection.) Now that the com-
2We thank L. Goldenberg and D. Mayers for a discussion on the
generality of Yao’s model.
mitment has been made, both sides may wait an arbitrary
length of time until the last step:
(c) Opening of the commitment: A specified and fixed
number of rounds of quantum communication alternately
between Alice and Bob are again involved. As in step
(b), we model each round of quantum communication as
a unitary transformation on HD ⊗ HC (D ∈ {A,B}),
which in turn induces a unitary transformation on the
space H = HA ⊗HB ⊗HC .
In a secure bit commitment scheme, Bob will learn the
value of b and be convinced that Alice has already com-
mitted to that value of b at the end of step (b) and cannot
change it anymore in step (c).
However, we show that the above general scheme neces-
sarily fails because Alice can always cheat successfully by
using reversible unitary operations in step (b) and subse-
quently rotating a state that corresponds to b = 0 to one
that corresponds to b = 1 and vice versa in the beginning
of step (c). Note that Alice’s ability of cheating lies on
her capability of storing coherent quantum signals for a
long period of time (until the beginning of step (c)).
Let us justify our claim. Consider more closely the
situation at the end of step (b), the commitment phase.
Let |0〉com and |1〉com denote the state of H = HA⊗HB⊗
HC at that time corresponding to the two possible values
of b respectively. In order that Alice and Bob can follow
the procedures, they must know the exact forms of all the
unitary transformations involved.3 Therefore, Alice must
be capable of computing the two states |0〉com and |1〉com.
Since the channel will sit idle for a long while, its state has
to be trivial. We may, therefore, assume that the channel
C is in a prescribed pure state |u〉C at the end of step (b).
Moreover, the fact that Bob has absolutely no information
about the value of b implies that the density matrix in his
hand is independent of the value of b. That is to say that
TrA (|0〉com〈0|com) = TrA (|1〉com〈1|com). But then |0〉com
and |1〉com of H must have the same Schmidt polar form
(See for example, the Appendix of [13].), namely:
|0〉com =
(∑
k
√
λk|eˆk〉A ⊗ |φˆk〉B
)
⊗ |u〉C , (1)
and
|1〉com =
(∑
k
√
λk|eˆk〉′A ⊗ |φˆk〉B
)
⊗ |u〉C , (2)
where |eˆk〉A and |eˆk〉′A are two orthonormal bases of HA
and |φˆk〉B is an orthonormal basis of HB.
3As stated earlier, any probabilistic scheme can be rephrased as
a deterministic one by considering the state of the combined system
of the quantum dice and the original system.
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The key observation is that these two states are related
by a unitary transformation acting on HA alone! Conse-
quently, Alice can make a fake commitment and change
the value of b in the beginning of step (c). For exam-
ple, she may proceed as follows: First, Alice always takes
b = 0 in step (a) and goes through step (b). It is only in
the beginning of step (c) that Alice decides on the actual
value of b that she wishes to open. If she decides b = 0
now, she can go through step (c) honestly. If she wishes
to change the value of b from 0 to 1, she simply applies
a unitary transformation to rotate her state from |0〉com
to |1〉com before going through step (c). Since the uni-
tary transformation acts on HA alone, Bob clearly has no
way of knowing Alice’s dishonesty.4 In conclusion, pro-
vided that Alice possesses quantum computers and quan-
tum storage devices, our results show that all quantum
bit commitment schemes are insecure because Alice can
cheat successfully by using an EPR-type of attack.
2.3 Non-ideal bit commitment
In our above discussion, we have assumed that the bit
commitment scheme is ideal in the sense that Bob has
absolutely no information about the value of b at the end
of step (b). This is the physical reason behind the math-
ematical statement that ρcom
0
= TrA (|0〉com〈0|com) =
TrA (|1〉com〈1|com) = ρcom1 . (i.e., the two density matrices
corresponding to the two cases b = 0 and b = 1 are iden-
tical.) However, in realistic applications, one might allow
Bob to have a very tiny amount of information about b at
that time. It is intuitively obvious that this is not going
to change our conclusion. On the one hand, if Bob has a
large probability of distinguishing between the two states
corresponding to b = 0 and b = 1 at the end of step (b),
the scheme is inherently unsafe against Bob. On the other
hand, if Bob has a small probability of distinguishing be-
tween the two states, then clearly, the density matrices
ρcom0 = TrA (|0〉com〈0|com) and ρcom1 = TrA (|1〉com〈1|com)
must be close to each other in some sense. We have seen
in the last subsection that when the two density matri-
ces are identical, Alice can always cheat successfully. It
is, therefore, at least highly suggestive that, when the two
density matrices are only slightly different, Alice will have
a probability close to 1 of cheating successfully. A detailed
calculation, which will be sketched briefly in the next sub-
section, shows that this is indeed the case. Therefore, even
4What is the problem with quantum bit commitment? Here is an
analogy. Suppose that there are two novels whose first halves are the
same, but the second halves are different. I give you only the first
half of one of the two novels and I tell you that I have committed
to a particular novel and that I cannot change it anymore. Will you
trust me? Of course not. Since the first halves of the two novels are
the same, no real commitment has been made. I am free to give you
the second half of either novel and claim that I have committed to
either one all along. There is no way for you to tell whether I am
lying.
non-ideal bit commitment schemes are necessarily highly
insecure.
2.4 Fidelity
In this subsection, following Mayers[19], we sketch the
mathematical proof of the insecurity of non-ideal quan-
tum bit commitment scheme. Readers who are uninter-
ested in mathematical details may skip this subsection on
first reading. The price that they have to pay is to take
Eqs. (6) and (8) for granted.
First of all, the fidelity [11, 14] between two density
matrices ρ0 and ρ1 of a system B is defined as
F (ρ0, ρ1) = Tr
√
ρ
1/2
1
ρ0ρ
1/2
1
. (3)
0 ≤ F ≤ 1. F = 1 if and only if ρ0 = ρ1. Returning to
the case of non-ideal bit commitment that we have been
considering, the fact that Bob has a small probability for
distinguishing between two states ρcom
0
and ρcom
1
implies
that the fidelity F (ρcom0 , ρ
com
1 ) is very close to 1. i.e.,
F (ρcom
0
, ρcom
1
) = 1− δ, (4)
where δ is small.
An alternative and equivalent definition of fidelity in-
volves the concept of purification. Imagine another sys-
tem E attached to our given system B. There are many
pure states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 on the composite system such
that
TrE (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|) = ρ0 and TrE (|ψ1〉〈ψ1|) = ρ1. (5)
The pure states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are called the purifications
of the density matrices ρ0 and ρ1. The fidelity can be
defined as
F (ρ0, ρ1) = max|〈ψ0|ψ1〉| (6)
where the maximization is over all possible purifications.
We remark that for any fixed purification of ρ1, there
exists a maximally parallel purification of ρ0 satisfying
Eq. (6).
Let us go back to a non-ideal quantum bit commitment
scheme. We take E to be the combined system of Alice’s
machine A and the channel C. It follows from Eqs. (4)
and (6) that, for the state |1〉com which is a purification
of ρcom1 , there exist a purification |ψ0〉ABC of ρcom0 such
that
|〈ψ0|1〉com| = F (ρcom0 , ρcom1 ) = 1− δ. (7)
The strategy of a cheating Alice is the same as in the
ideal case. She always prepares the state |0〉 correspond-
ing to b = 0 in step (a) and goes through step (b). She
decides on the value of b she likes only in the beginning
of the step (c). If she chooses b = 0, of course, she can
just follow the rule. If she chooses b = 1, she applies
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a unitary transformation to obtain the state |ψ0〉ABC in
H = HA⊗HB ⊗HC . Notice that if she had been honest,
the state would have been |1〉com instead. Since |ψ0〉ABC
and |1〉com are so similar to each other (See Eq. (7).), Bob
clearly has a hard time in detecting the dishonesty of Al-
ice. Therefore, Alice can cheat successfully with a very
large probability.
Yet another equivalent definition of the fidelity, which
will be useful in the next section, can be given in terms of
positive-operator-valued-measures (POVMs). A POVM
is a set {Eˆb} of positive operators (i.e., Hermitian oper-
ators with non-negative eigenvalues) that satisfy a sort
of completeness relation (i.e.,
∑
b Eˆb equals the identity
operator). A POVM simply represents the most general
measurement that can be performed on a system. More
concretely, it is implemented by a) placing the system in
contact with an auxiliary system or ancilla prepared in
a standard state, b) evolving the two by a unitary oper-
ator, and c) performing an ordinary von Neumann mea-
surement on the ancilla. In terms of POVMs, the fidelity
is defined as
F (ρ0, ρ1) = min
∑
b
√
Trρ0Eˆb
√
Trρ1Eˆb, (8)
where the minimization is over all POVMs, {Eˆb}. Eq. (8)
will be useful in the next section.
3 Quantum coin tossing
Suppose that Alice and Bob are having a divorce and that
they are living far away from each other. They would like
to decide by a coin flip over the telephone who is going
to keep the house. Of course, if one of them is tossing a
real coin, there is no way for the other to tell if he/she is
cheating. Therefore, there must be something else that
is simulating the coin flip. Just like bit commitment,
coin tossing can be done in classical cryptography either
through trusted intermediaries or by accepting some un-
proven cryptographic assumptions. The question is: Can
quantum mechanics help to remove those requirements?
In other words, do coin tossing schemes whose security is
based solely on the law of quantum physics exist?
Notice that a secure bit commitment protocol can be
used trivially to implement a secure coin tossing protocol5
but the converse is not true. Coin tossing is a weaker pro-
tocol for which we have a weaker result—ideal quantum
coin tossing schemes do not exist. We define an ideal coin
tossing scheme as one that satisfies the following require-
ments:6
5Alice chooses a bit and commits it to Bob. Bob simply tells
Alice his guess for her bit. Alice then opens her commitment to see
if Bob has guessed correctly.
6We gratefully thank Goldenberg and Mayers for many discus-
sions which are very helpful for sharpening and clarifying our ideas.
1) At the end of the coin tossing scheme, there are three
possible outcomes: ‘0’, ‘1’ or ‘invalid’.
2) Both users know which outcome occurs.
3) If the outcomes ‘0’ or ‘1’ occur, Alice and Bob can be
sure that they occur with precisely the (non-zero) proba-
bilities, say 1/2 each, prescribed by the protocol.
4) If both users are honest, the outcome ‘invalid’ will
never occur.
In other words, in an ideal coin tossing scheme, both
parties will always agree with each other on the outcome.
There is no room for dispute. Also, cheating in an ideal
coin tossing will only lead to a non-vanishing probability
for the occurence of ‘invalid’ as an outcome, but will not
change the relative probability of occurence of ‘0’ and ‘1’.
Most coin tossing schemes are non-ideal. However, any
non-ideal quantum coin tossing scheme can be regarded
as an approximation to an ideal scheme. Investigations
of the ideal scheme may, therefore, shed some lights on
those more realistic, but non-ideal, ones. To show that
ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible, we first prove
the following Lemma.
Lemma: Given that Alice and Bob initially share no en-
tangled quantum states, they cannot achieve ideal quan-
tum coin tossing without any further communication be-
tween each other.
Proof: An ideal coin tossing scheme will give Alice
and Bob non-zero mutual information. However, with-
out prior classical communication, the maximal amount
of mutual information that can be gained by Alice and
Bob through local operations on shared entangled quan-
tum states is bounded by the entropy of formation. In the
absence of entanglement, they cannot share any mutual
information. Hence, coin tossing without prior commu-
nication nor shared entangled quantum states must be
impossible.
Now we come to the main theorem.
Theorem: Given that Alice and Bob initially share no
entangled quantum states, ideal quantum coin tossing is
impossible.
Proof: The idea of our proof is simple. We prove by
contradiction using backward induction. Let us assume
that an ideal quantum coin tossing can be done with a
fixed and finite number, N , rounds of communication be-
tween Alice and Bob. We will prove that it can be done
in N − 1 rounds. By repeated induction, it can be done
without any communication between Alice and Bob at all.
This is impossible because of the above Lemma.
The induction step from N rounds to N − 1 rounds:
Suppose that there exists an ideal quantum coin tossing
protocol which involves N alternate rounds of communi-
cation between Alice and Bob. We need to prove that
an ideal quantum coin tossing protocol with only N − 1
rounds exists. Let us concentrate on theN -th round of the
communication. Without much loss of generality, assume
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that it is Alice’s turn to send quantum signals through the
channel C in the N -th round. As this is the last round,
by the definition of ideal coin tossing, Alice can perform
a measurement and determine the outcome, 0, 1 or ‘in-
valid’, before sending out the last round signals to Bob.
Notice that Alice should have no objection against elimi-
nating the N -th round altogether because she has nothing
to gain in sending the last round signals (other than con-
vincing Bob of the outcome). On the other hand, Bob is
supposed to learn the outcome of the coin tossing through
the combined state in HB⊗HC . However, Alice, who has
already known the outcome herself, may attempt to alter
Bob’s outcome by changing the mixed state in HC that
she is sending through the channel. This is essentially the
same strategy of cheating as in the case of quantum bit
commitment discussed earlier.
For the three possible outcomes in Alice’s measurement,
0, 1 and ‘invalid’, let us denote the corresponding den-
sity matrices in Bob’s control before the receipt of the
N -th round signals by ρB
0
, ρB
1
and ρB
invalid
respectively.
Alice’s ability of cheating successfully against an honest
Bob depends on the values of the fidelities F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
),
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
invalid
) and F (ρB1 , ρ
B
invalid
). Here for simplicity, we
assume that there is a single pure state corresponding
to the outcome ‘invalid’. However, our arguments are
general. For ideal quantum coin tossing, we demand the
probability of Alice cheating successfully should be ex-
actly zero. This implies, with the definition of fidelity
in Eq. (6), that F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 0, F (ρ
B
0 , ρ
B
invalid
) = 0 and
F (ρB
1
, ρB
invalid
) = 0. It then follows from Eq. (8) that ρB
0
,
ρB
1
and ρB
invalid
have orthogonal supports and can be com-
pletely distinguished from one another even without the
last round of transmission from Alice. Hence, even Bob
has nothing to gain from the last round of communica-
tion. A truncated ideal coin tossing scheme with only
N − 1 rounds of communication must, therefore, be as se-
cure as the original N -round scheme. This completes our
inductive argument and we conclude that ideal quantum
coin tossing is impossible.
Unlike quantum bit commitment, for quantum coin
tossing, there is no simple way to generalize our proof
of the impossibility of the ideal scheme the non-ideal
schemes. This is surprising because no such distinction
has been previously noted in the literature. As far as
we know, all previously proposed quantum coin tossing
schemes are based on quantum bit commitment schemes.
The security of non-ideal quantum coin tossing should be
an important subject for future investigations. We hope
that our investigation for the ideal case will shed light on
the subtleties in the non-ideal case.
4 A constraint on two-party se-
cure computation
Let us consider the issue of two-party secure computation
in a more general setting. The idea of two-party secure
computation is the following: Alice has a secret x and Bob
has another secret y. Both would like to know the result
f(x, y) at the end of a computation and be sure that the
result is correct. However, neither side wishes the other
side to learn more about its own secret than what can be
deduced from the output f(x, y). As mentioned earlier,
classical cryptographic schemes can implement two-party
secure computation at the cost of introducing trusted
intermediaries or accepting unproven cryptographic as-
sumptions. Our results in the last two sections strongly
suggest that, in principle at least, quantum cryptography
would not be useful for getting rid of those requirements
in two-party secure computation. Even if quantum me-
chanics does not help, one may ask if there is any way
of implementing a two-party computation that is secure
from an information-theoretic point of view? In partic-
ular, if quantum mechanics turned out to be wrong and
were replaced by a new physical theory, would it be con-
ceivable that two-party secure computation can be done in
this new theory? Here we argue that if Alice and Bob are
shameless enough to declare their dishonesty and stop the
computation whenever one of them has a slightest advan-
tage over the other in the amount of mutual information
he/she has on the function f(x, y), a two-party secure
computation can never be implemented.
For simplicity, let us normalize everything and assume
that initially both Alice and Bob have no information
about f(x, y) and at the end of the computation, both
have 1 bit of information about f(x, y). Let us suppose
further than Alice and Bob are unkind enough to stop the
computation whenever one of them has an ǫ bit of infor-
mation more than the other. Any realistic scheme must
involve a finite number say N alternate rounds of commu-
nication between Alice and Bob. An analogy is that two
persons, Alice and Bob, are walking in discrete alternate
steps from the starting point 0 to the finishing line set at
1. Altogether N steps are made and it is demanded that
Alice and Bob will never be separated from each other
for more than a distance ǫ.7 Clearly, this implies Nǫ ≥ 1
or N ≥ 1/ǫ. Therefore, the smaller the tolerable rela-
tive informational advantage ǫ is, the larger the number
of rounds of communication N is needed. Notice that the
constraint Nǫ ≥ 1 applies to any two-party secure com-
7Actually, there is a minor subtlety in quantum cryptography.
Each time when one user, say Alice, advances, the other user, say
Bob, may slip backwards. The point is: the quantum “no-cloning
theorem” states that quantum signals cannot be copied. When Bob
sends signals to Alice, he loses control over the signals that he sends.
In other words, Bob’s available information tends to decrease when-
ever he sends signals to Alice.
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putation scheme. In particular, it remains valid even if
quantum mechanics is wrong.
It may also be of some interest to speculate that a simi-
lar inequality Nǫ ≥ 0(1) may hold for non-ideal quantum
coin tossing schemes where N is the number of rounds of
communication and ǫ is the probability that a user cheats
successfully. Consequently, as ǫ → 0, N → ∞ and ideal
quantum coin tossing with finite rounds of communication
becomes impossible.
5 Summary
We have shown that all realistic quantum bit commitment
and ideal quantum coin tossing protocols are, in princi-
ple, insecure. The basic problem is that the users can
cheat using an EPR-type of attack. Our results totally
contradict well-known claims of “provably unbreakable”
schemes in the literature, whose analyses on EPR attack
were flawed, and provide strong evidence against the se-
curity of quantum cryptography in “post-cold-war” appli-
cations, at least in principle. The early optimism in the
subject is, therefore, misplaced. Nevertheless, quantum
bit commitment schemes that are secure in practice may
still exist8 because it is notoriously difficult for cheaters
with current technology to store quantum signals for an
arbitrary length of time. A more serious consideration is
the following. In order to cheat successfully, a cheater may
need a quantum computer, but such a computer is not
yet available with current technology. Therefore, we can
trade the traditional complexity assumption with an as-
sumption on the inability of the cheater to store quantum
signals for a long period of time and to build and operate
a quantum computer. This subject deserves further in-
vestigations. Another important unsolved problem is the
security of non-ideal quantum coin tossing. Finally, we re-
mark that, thanks to the quantum “no-cloning” theorem,
the security of quantum key distribution[9, 16, 18, 20] is
widely accepted and quantum cryptography is useful at
least for this purpose. We expect that quantum key dis-
tribution will remain a fertile subject for years to come.
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